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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the outcomes of the 2011 Arab Spring from the
perspective of regime types within the Middle East and North Africa. The intense year of protest that
spread throughout the Arab world had disparate effects between countries which this paper investigates.
Utilizing an institutional approach, I separate the Arab world into monarchic and republican systems
relying on data provided by the Arab Barometer II and III. Theoretically, I suggest, and find evidence to
support, that monarchies were more resistant to the Arab protests because desires for change were not as
strong within these countries because of the historical arrangements within these countries.
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INTRODUCTION: ACCOUNTING FOR INSTABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

In February of 2011, the streets of Cairo were filled with celebrating Egyptians. They had just gotten
word that the long reigned Hosni Mubarak had just stepped down. Leila Fadel of the Washington Post
wrote, “On Friday, pro-democracy demonstrators achieved through peaceful and determined protests
what only a month ago had seemed impossible: they forced President Hosni Mubarak from office” (Fadel
2011). Across the Arab world in 2011, longtime rulers whose regime security was once thought to be
unassailable were ousted by popular demands. An atypical event in Middle Eastern regime transitions
which had historically had ruled and died by their militaries. The popular uprisings were dubbed “The
Arab Spring” and culminated in the dismantling of the Egyptian, Tunisian, Yemeni, and Libyan regimes
as protestors took to the street demanding an end to the political and economic woes that had plagued
those countries for the past decades (Owen 2012). Those regimes that did survive still had to contend with
a disgruntled citizenry and a post Arab Spring environment. Despite the regional effects of the populist
movement, countries were disparately affected with the concentration of destabilization hitting the Arab
republics and sparing the monarchies (Owen 2012, 2).
During 2011, Bahraini sheik, Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, felt the impact of the Arab Spring as mostly
Shia protestors took to the streets to challenge the Sunni government. Expectations were flummoxed and
a wait and see attitude was taken to see how the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states would react
while having to deal with their own possible protests (El Alaoui 2013). Instead of the domino effect that
had happened in neighboring republics, the protestors, in the other kingdoms didn’t show up, as they had
elsewhere, to challenge their sheiks and kings. The GCC was able to respond to Khalifa’s need for
assistance and no Arab monarch was overthrown during these tumultuous years. This presents an
interesting puzzle for Middle East scholars: why were the Arabian kingdoms, in large part, spared popular
mobilization? This question has been examined before and to great lengths (Snyder 2015) (Yom and
Gausse 2012). Robert Snyder takes up this question in his article on the persistence of Arab monarchies
after the Arab Spring responding that, “One might expect that the citizens of the monarchical states would
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have used the Arab uprising begun in the republican states as a spark to begin protesting in large numbers
for their rights as well…” (Snyder 2015, 1037). More puzzling, a large chunk of academia had been
dedicated to exploring how mixed regimes, associated with Arab republics, are demonstrably more stable
because they include electoral features (Ghandi and Przeworski 2007) (Blaydes 2008) (Brownlee 2009).
And yet, it was the Arab republics that faltered against the harsh realities of the Arab Spring. In a reversal
of expected outcomes, the monarchs have been an elusive target for regime change since the last
kingdom-to-republic transition which occurred in Iran in 1979.
The recent protests in the Arab republics and the stability of monarchism presents a more interesting
conundrum that, perhaps, the monarchies are more effective at meeting their citizen’s wants and needs.
The main motivations behind the protestation movement were calls for democratic reform, and a reversal
of the economic woes plaguing these countries (Brownlee, Masoud and Reynolds, 2015). From this
perspective, prima facie logic suggests that these issues weren’t as salient in the Arab monarchies. The
Arab Spring revolution was multifaceted and had its causal roots in historical contexts which demands
deeper study. Therefore I move beyond the Arab Spring to answer this question structurally, and
investigate through this thesis to answer the debate of monarchical stability in the region and its relative
immunity to popular mobilization. I present a theory as to why this may be the case utilizing a mechanism
which binds the stronger Arab monarchies allowing them to succeed in a rapidly modernizing world and
how this causal instrument influences popular sentiment within monarchies. By looking at the causal
factors of the Arab Spring and testing these indicators between Arab countries a pattern of resiliency
should emerge.
1.1

The Middle East and the Indicators of the Arab Spring
The Middle East presents an interesting comparative region in that it is largely homogenous,

culturally speaking, with a unique shared history. Before delving into the explanation of purpose and the
terminology this thesis uses, I wanted to briefly account for this history of the Middle East and North
Africa (MENA). After this setup, I highlight the indicators that are arguably associated for causing the
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pan-Arab uprisings in 2011. The establishment of these indicators is an important task as it creates the
components that can be tested to answer the previously stated question posed by this thesis.
The history of Middle East is both complex and ancient. Since this paper is an exercise of
discovering modern explanations, I limit the historical context to the more immediate past. The Arab
states have long been the cogs of empires since the reign of the Ottoman’s over what would be largely be
considered the MENA except for a few Gulf and North African states. These few states were not spared,
however, imperialistic subjugation as by the end of World War I European powers had come to dominate
nearly all of the physical and political landscape in a bid to maintain the large swaths of oil resources and
sustain their own empires. After the Ottoman defeat in 1916 and subsequent partitioning by Allied forces,
“It was they who determined all of the new boundaries; they decided who should rule, and what form of
government should be established” (Owen 1992, 11). After World War II these states began to seek
independence and the current nation states of the Arab world began to take form in this era along the post
WWI demarcations. Roger Owen emphasizes the early regime choices of Arab states as reminiscent of
the imperial decisions of France and Great Britain (Owen 1992). For instance, Owen notes that French
rulers were more likely to rely on republican forms of governance while the British had a penchant for
monarchism.
Bureaucracy within these countries, established by the ruling empires, created imbalances
between ruler and ruled. The nascent quality of these state governments along with the lack of natural
ebbing of state borders compounded with high volumes of natural resources within certain countries
would have disastrous consequences for some rulers. Fragile governments had to quickly establish firm
control or face coups and rebellions such as which occurred in Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Libya. The large oil
reserves of the region created an investment crisis by outside forces dependent on the flow of crude
establishing a dynamic where weak states were externally supported and stronger states were hamstringed
and unable to grow (Lustick 1997). As Ian Lustick argues, Arab states were constrained by the
international community and status quo norms of the mid 20th Century creating a region full of fragile
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states (Lustick 1997). Comparatively, historical European state formation took a more violent tone as
“war made the state and the state made war” (Tilly 1975, 42). The nation state identity and bureaucracy of
the European country was formed from this conflict and had the added benefit of establishing stronger
states as the smaller, peripheral ones were absorbed (Tilly 1990). Arab countries would experience no
such revolution of institutional state building.
Via inheritance of colonial bureaucracies that were designed for maximum resource extraction
and coercion most Arab states were established on shaky ground and, in many instances, lacked
legitimacy (Owen 1992). The fledgling Arab regimes were dependent, in large part, on external support
which could take the form of purchases from the selling of resources or direct foreign aid. The fragility of
these regimes became apparent as a wave of nationalist revolutions and coups erupted in many states in
the region during the 50’s through the 70’s. Monarchies were cast down and became republics and those
republics were then captured by dictators. The new “presidents for life” and surviving monarchs
structured their reigns around stronger, and more violent coercive institutions to ensure the regime’s (i.e.
their) survival (Ibrahim 2016).
Certainly, the Arab Spring has its roots in the yearnings to reform these corrupt regimes from
within but the causal factors are more complex as to why they culminated when they did in some states
and not others. Kamal Salih insinuates the down turn of the global economy that occurred in the late
2000’s as a possibility, with lack of foreign aid able to support these violent yet fragile regimes (Salih
2013). Rather than emphasizing spontaneous factors as causal, some authors point to the structural
failures of these particular states. Salih writes,
“Long-term, embedded structural factors leading to the Arab Spring comprise corruption,
State repression, denial of political freedoms, the failure of traditional powers to accommodate
and recognize new youth movements, the gaps between the various regions in the country, the
domination of economic resources by the few through the alliance of State authority and the

5
capital of private individuals, and the spread of poverty and unemployment among massive
swathes of the population” (Salih 2013, 188).
I utilize Salih’s causal map but trace them through the patterns endemic to the specific structures
that make up the Arab countries. Furthermore, I divide the causal variables into two categories following
Akkas and Ozekin’s categorization in that one half of the causal coin was socio-political while the other
was socio-economic (Akkas and Ozekin 2014). Salih’s arguments could be grouped similarly but he
places the onus of the popular revolt on the specifications of two indicators: economic woes, and desire
for reform (Salih 2013, 187).1 I present a third variable which bridges the economic and social fracturing
that may have occurred in these states that I express as my theoretical argument: inability to meet the
needs of the population as an approximate amalgamation of the economic and social problems. For
organizational purposes, I will test and develop a structural theory of why certain regimes are producing
higher or lower values for each variable and examine how they stand as possible causal mechanisms.
1.2

Purpose and Terms
The purpose of this thesis is to present an institutional argument to suggest that Arab monarchies

create stronger, more stable regimes as compared to their republican neighbors. It is meant to detract from
hybrid regime models as well as explanations overly reliant on rentierism or culture. The overall goal of
this paper is to leverage more explanation as to why monarchism does so well in this corner of the globe
and then to scope that as a possible explanation as to why the Arab Spring failed to take hold in certain
Middle Eastern countries. The Middle East is used interchangeably with MENA in this paper and
stretches from Morocco in the West to Iran in the East. To test this position, I create three models from
the causal variables associated with the Arab Spring: economic performance, risk of democratic reform,
and government performance as provided by the Arab Barometer (AB) II and III datasets. By testing
these statistics against regime types my thesis purpose is to investigate the causal pattern associated with

1

Salih develops this argument beyond just desire for reform and includes regime corruption, abuse of individual
freedoms and violations of human rights having all played a role. However, in the interest of keeping this argument
tighter, I subsume these under the socio-political umbrella of desire for reforming the regime.
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successful regimes and to ultimately ascertain whether regime destabilizing variables are less pronounced
in Middle East monarchies.
This paper relies extensively on the usage of the words monarchism and republicanism. These
phrases can mean many things in different contexts as they are largely generalized and lack specificity.
For instance, both the UK and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia could be classified as monarchies but these
regimes are extremely different in both inward and outward operations. Republics fall under the same
generalized terminology that could have different definitional implications. Sartori’s ladder of generality
contends a need for specificity in explaining cause and consequences in an argument, something this
paper seeks to do (Sartori 1970). However, due to the shared regime tropes within the Middle East, I’m
able to avoid Collier’s notion of “democracy with adjectives” and able to maintain the use of these more
generalized words (Collier 1997). Differentiating between MENA monarchies leads to very little gain in
specificity between regime types as these nuances don’t necessarily lead to conflicting explanations
within the region. For instance, the arguably parliamentary monarchy of Kuwait resisted the Arab Spring
protests equally as well as the absolutist monarchy in Saudi Arabia. From this position, the initial
estimated catalyst of regime stability is that they are monarchies. Therefore, I qualify both absolutist and
parliamentary monarchies as such. Monarchies, for the sake of this paper, are any state with a king as the
head of the country. My use of the term republic and mixed regimes follows a similar line of reasoning
for its lack of differentiation between subtypes. Republics will be any Middle Eastern country that relies
on presidential executives not founded on a hereditary basis. Regime types are derived from Ellen Lust’s
chapter in The Arab Spring Explained and are available in Table 1.1 below (Lust 2012). One should note
from Table 1.1 that monarchs and republics exists almost to a one to one ratio in the MENA.
Table 1.1 MENA Countries and Regime Types before the Arab Spring
Country
Algeria
Bahrain
Egypt
Iran

Regime Type
Presidential Republic
Monarch
Presidential Republic
Presidential Republic
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Iraq
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Morocco
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Sudan
Syria
Tunisia
United Arab Emirates
Yemen
1.3

Presidential Republic
Monarch
Monarch
Presidential Republic
Presidential Republic
Monarch
Monarch
Monarch
Monarch
Presidential Republic
Presidential Republic
Presidential Republic
Monarch
Presidential Republic

Organization and Expected Results
This thesis is presented in several sections. First, I analyze the previous literature and arguments

that could explain the structural mechanics of monarchic regime survival and republican collapse or the
inverse as organized around the two categorizations: socio-economic, and socio-political variation. In this
section I attempt to dislodge regional exceptionalism in regards to modernization theory, explore
republican institutional expectations and failures, cultural explanations, as well as resource curse
arguments as reigning explanatory factors for regime stability in the Middle East. Following the
presentation of the literature of possible explanations as to how some of these Arab states survived the
recent popular uprisings, I provide a short case analysis of the Arab Spring between monarchic and
republican outcomes. From this study, I present my theory as to what could causally explain the
survivability of monarchs and then put forward several hypotheses that would be empirically evident
within the data provided by Arab Barometer surveys. Afterwards, I present several models to test whether
economics, democracy, or government effectiveness explain the outcomes of the Arab Spring and regime
capitulations. Lastly, I conclude the paper by reinforcing what the data has shown and what broader
questions and concerns this evidence could provide.
By presenting my theory first, I will be utilizing the deductive method for answering my proposed
question of monarchical regime stability. Logically, this should allow me to build a more precise causal
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argument as to explain what is going on in the Middle East in regards to which country experiences
regime destabilizing protests and to what degree. Referring to the expressed causes of the Arab Spring,
one should expect to observe differing degrees of these causal variables within monarchies than their
republican neighbors who faced overthrow. More specifically, I suspect that citizens in monarchic states
will more likely rate their government’s effectiveness higher, economic outlook as more positive and
democratic compatibility ranked lower than their republican neighbors.
I theorize that republican or mixed/hybrid regime countries breed higher levels of dissatisfaction
by relying on a causal mechanism developed by David Waldner known as “constituent-clientelism”
which formalizes competitive goods redistribution through electoral methods (Waldner 1999, 39). In
contrast, monarchies rely on a direct form of patron-clientelism where the “system typically results from
the gradual inclusion of masses into more centralized systems dominated by oligarchic elites…” (Waldner
1999, 40). Specifically, a causal loop exists between the effects of the type of nascent institution building
that occurs and economic outcomes. From this point, how a state arranges itself has consequences for how
well a state performs, provides for its citizens, and able to suppress unrequited demands. This impacts
present day scenarios, such as regime vulnerability during the Arab Spring, because the two Waldnerian
institutional mechanisms lead to disparate outcomes in regime stability. I will expand on these concepts
more in the theoretical portion of this paper.

2

LITERATURE REVIEW: EXPLANATIONS OF ARAB REGIME SURVIVAL

In this section I consider the literature of explaining state development and what could possibly
create stronger states within monarchies. The literature of autocratic regime survival is vast and offers
some possible explanations as to how to answer the question presented in this thesis. How did monarchic
regimes so successfully avoid the pan-Arab protestation movement aimed at reformation, economic
improvement, and anti-corruption? Much of the literature is scoped either before or after the Arab Spring
and ranges from transitional literature to economic explanations. To respond to this wide range of
arguments that suit the possible explanations I have broken down this research into categories that best
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address the different causal mechanisms associated with the Arab Spring to see if they can address the
conundrum of why such a wide ranging event would be almost entirely isolated to regime type.
I organize this section around the two structural factors related to the Arab Spring as divided
between social and economic issues. First, I set up the institutional confines and expectations that have
been historically present in the region. In this section I investigate what the structural differences are
between monarchies and republics to set up how they built their nascent regimes and also shed light on
how they may respond to political strife via rational choice patterns of decision making. From this
position, I then explore the demands for reform and democratization as applied through the modernization
thesis and how it relates to the creation of efficiency and stability problems for developing countries.
Next, I investigate the economic realities that separate monarchic and republican regimes. The purpose of
this section is to highlight the specific structural arrangements within republics and monarchies and how
they are able to cope with the problems of meeting societal needs in the modernization context.
The last two sections I move beyond the confines of social and economic issues to address the
broader implications of the cause and effect relationship. First, I investigate how these two forces work
together in concert to have a repercussive impact. To do so I highlight the expectations of the mixed
regime literature and conclude how the Arab Spring has weakened this argument. In rebuttal, I offer a
counter concept as to regime efficacy utilizing Waldner’s constituent-clientelism premise as an alternative
explanation of regime survival within the institution building framework. This should provide a
theoretical arrangement as to the why the Arab Spring protests occurred by highlighting a new causal
variable: ability for the government to fulfill the needs of their population or what I term as regime
efficacy. Finally, I conclude on an examination of the literature that takes on the exceptional features that
could offer alternative explanations to this puzzle in relation to the Middle East such as culture,
colonialism, youth movements, and resource curse.
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2.1

MENA Institutions and the Structure of Regimes
Before one can approach the structural causes of the Arab Spring it is important to take into

account how these structures form and what uses they have within each regime. Institutions within
authoritarian regimes have been likened to mere “window dressing” and that the real power of decision
making lie in the hands of a select few elites (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007, 1292). Certainly there is
evidence to support this position as autocratic regimes renege frequently and apply arbitrary usage of their
institutions but it is inaccurate to apply this thought across every case and every institution. Instead, I
maintain, as many authors do as well, that institutions matter and they allow for effective control of the
state. Structures that the regime put in place give legitimacy to their actions and should be taken seriously.
It is within these early institutional choices that the structural constraints for each regime to act can be tied
to the causal phenomena.
Institutionalists maintain that decisions by state leaders should follow a rational choice
framework as those institutions that survive do so based on the merits of their efficacy in lubricating
cooperation between groups. Imperfect information and fear of defection and cheating makes
collaboration a difficult prospect to achieve without creating rules and subsequent norms to allay those
fears. If interaction exists as a zero-sum game, the point of institutions is to change the cost-to-gains ratio
and allow for cooperation. This element of social interaction has been regarded before by many authors
including Robert Keohane and Douglas North. Both Keohane and North present this cooperation
conundrum as a problem institutions surmount by acting to alleviate the costs associated with
collaboration (North 1991) (Keohane 1984). Rational choice dictates that relative gains according to
individual preferences will affect outcomes. However, Keohane sees institutions as a response to repeated
games of interaction that pushes the value of immediate reward below absolute gains allowing for and
rewarding cooperation within the structure (Keohane, 1984). In regards to building nascent regimes,
North maintains one should expect state building and the institutions that spring from it to be efficient in
reducing the costs associated with ruling (North 1991).
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The logic behind entrenched rulers investing in institutions is that they expect to retain power far
into the future and install systems to help them to do so (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). For
authoritarians and mixed regimes, which the Arab republics and monarchs are considered, this position
implies that in order to rule one has to create rules. From this perspective, it becomes more evident why
an Arab republican president uses open elections as a tool, as Ghandi and Przerworski would argue, for
co-opting opposition and power signaling. The evidence demonstrates that authoritarian regimes with
parliaments are less likely to face civil strife (Lust 2006, 457). This also explains why monarchs will
likewise rely on parliamentary institutions as well. In Kuwait, Michael Herb explains that impending
danger from Iraqi invasion was enough to encourage the establishment and preservation of a modern
Kuwaiti parliament in the 1960’s and can be attributed to its survival as an independent state (Herb 2014).
Despite the reliance on institutions, some scholars acknowledge these formations are merely
“window dressing”. Do institutions really matter to a state that condenses much of its political power into
the hands of a select few? Gandhi and Przeworski and many other academics who study regimes which
rely on institutions, or mixed regimes, contend institutional reliance as a key component to regime
survival. However, there is a definitive split between how republican and monarchical states benefit from
them. The expectation hypothesized by much of the literature on autocracies is biased towards regimes
that build and rely on electoral mechanisms. As will be shown below, the modernization thesis holds very
little regard for monarchic survival and the literature comprising mixed regimes points to the same
conclusion. Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski view monarchic regime stability as an outlier
contending that the majority of states experience overthrow if they rely too heavily on monotonic
authoritarianism (Gandhi and Przeworki 2007). Indeed, they accurately conclude that the monarchs of
Libya, Egypt, Iraq, and Iran all faced capitulation. Instead, they argue that autocratic survival is sustained
when applied through legislatures. Legislatures allow the state to distribute goods, co-opt elites into the
regime, and legitimize power sharing arrangements. Geddes reinforces this point showing the timelines of
regime survival being longest with single-party, parliamentary regimes (Geddes 2003). This could explain
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why Arab republics were so entrenched before the Arab Spring but there’s a lack of inclusion of
sustainable monarchism within these models. Absolute monarchies like the Gulf kingdoms which rely on
very little legislative tools undermine the expectations of the argument. Geddes acknowledges that
monarchies perform quite well although they don’t have the same longevity of their single-party
counterparts.
Reliance on specific institutions, such as elections, is endemic to the Arab region which suffers
from widespread legitimacy issues due to the high levels of authoritarianism. Legitimacy of rule is often a
fragile disposition and a characteristic shared by both kings and presidents in the area (Anderson 1991,
11). However, the reliance on specific structures to project legitimacy can be contradictory to effective
governance and can even lead to regime disintegration. Nygard and Knutsen expand this argument
showing empirically that monotonic autocracies are, indeed, more durable than “semi-democracies” and
can be explained by the lack of social cohesion within these states (Nygard and Knutsen 660). Applying
this logic directly to the Arab republics, the dependence on the illusion of ruling by the consent of the
governed through elections can demonstratively backfire. This is empirically evident in the Egyptian case
as the regime was forced to renege on losses in the 2010 elections providing a catalyst for Arab Spring
protestors in early 2011 (Lust 2014, 227). Because both regime types are dependent on ensuring their
populations see them as legitimate, Roger Owen argues, the dependence on coercive power between
republics and monarchs are similar in that they both build an extensive security apparatuses (Owen 2012).
However, the similarities between the monarchs and republics differ on some key components that
establish future stability issues and hamper effective governance for Arab republics that aren’t present in
the monarchies: succession, nationalism, and economic arrangements.
Monarchs have at their disposal a longer time horizon of expected rule as well as an institutional
succession clause for ensuring stable transfers of political power within the dynasty (Anderson 1991). The
dual entrenchment of the regime (both the king and the crown prince) incentivizes stronger institutions to
maintain the dynastic legacy (Saravio, 2015). The nature of republicanism relies on electoral mechanics
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which draws scrutiny when the entrenched leader attempts to establish hereditary lines of succession in
the executive. Indeed, Owen explains it was the future succession crises of aging Arab presidents that
acted as a medium for the Arab Spring. The “presidents for life”, Owen’s term, faced a backlash when
they moved towards passing the reins of power to their children (Owen 2012).
Another point of divergence between republican and monarchical autocrats within the literature is
the presidential embrace of nationalism and ideology and the rejection of these two ideas by the
kingdoms. From Nasserism to Ba’athism, nationalistic fervor swept up many Arab states after colonial
independence as leaders built ideological and nationalistic identities and infused them with electoral
practices within their respective states. Whereas the republics relied on nationalism to fuel their political
power from below, the literature contends that the antinationalist approach to modernization by monarchs
tended to make them more malleable and economically viable (Snyder 2015). For republics, institutional
power arrangements were codified within constitutions that expressed nationalism through electoral
mechanisms creating a populist method of sovereignty. Robert Snyder writes that it was an opposition to
“revolutionary nationalism” that established different political norms and structures within the
monarchies as opposed to their republican neighbors (Snyder 2015, 1028). Snyder argues that the
monarchies, who viewed nationalism as a threat, were motivated by practical institutions rather than
nationalistic and electoral ones (Snyder 2015, 1028, 1037). The impact of relying on nationalism was a
double-edged sword in that it rallied legitimacy to the nascent governments but it established new social
identities, class cleavages, and demands that the state then had to then fulfill (Snyder 2015).
From their reliance on Arab nationalism, Snyder posits, rulers created an ideologically grounded
economic model that nested inside the electoral mechanics of the republics (Snyder 2015, 1033). The
populism that was earlier trumpeted by founding presidents engendered redistribution and socialism
which relied on a steady stream of growth to satisfy popular demands (Owen 2012, 174). This
redistribution policy, Snyder argues, would come at the cost of sacrificing business and middle class
interests (Snyder 2015, 1033). With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the global shift to liberalization,
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aggressive socialism began to wane in the Arab republics too. As redistributive policy was failing to
produce economic growth to sustain popular demands, presidential leaders shifted gears towards
capitalism which deformed into a type of crony capitalism and one of political exclusivity (Snyder 2015,
1033).
The monarchs of the Middle East, who had disavowed nationalism and ideology, were founded
instead on pro-economic elitism and economic exclusiveness as tools to establish and maintain control
(Snyder 2015). Even when faced by the destabilizing force of the Arab Spring, the oil rich monarchies
utilized their resource wealth to placate any desire to move against the king. This outcome was
predictable given resource curse author Michael Ross having correctly predicted in his article, “Will Oil
Drown the Arab Spring?” (Ross 2012). In the non-oil rich states of Morocco and Jordan Victor Menaldo
argues that it was attention to the security apparatus and effective governance was enough to dismantle
any call for political change (Menaldo 2012). I will touch more on this economic model that the Arab
monarchies shared in later sections.
2.2

Modernization: Desire for Reform and Transitions to Democracy
One of the causal pieces in the “cocktail of major factors that… created the social explosion” of

the Arab Spring was the repressive nature of the governments (Salih 2013, 186). Much of the postanalysis literature indicates a transitional focus of the evidence and interpreting whether this was a new
wave of democratization. It has been regarded as a possible “Fourth Wave” of democratization in relation
to Huntington’s description of the third wave which occurred in Eastern European states after the collapse
of the Soviet Union. However, the data remains flimsy (Abushouk 2016). The lack of successful
transitions to change and retain new democratic governments as a result of the mobilization which
occurred makes for a weak comparison to the third wave of democratization. Indeed, of the many states
affected by this protestation movement, only Tunisia has successfully transitioned to a more democratic
state. However, the initiation of protests and castigation of authoritarian rulers indicate that that there is a
strong desire for reform within these countries. Huntington describes this phenomenon as modernization
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and as Arab states continue to grow and modernize so too will the frequency for the demand to reform
(Huntington 1997).
There can be little doubt that Middle Eastern countries are modernizing and at rapid pace. These
indicators are visible through social and labor reorganizations, economic growth, and quality of life
improvements (Mondal 2016). While many of these modernity indicators are abstract in nature, some are
easily measurable such as GDP per capita growth. Some would also consider secularization another
aspect but when considering modernization one should separate the contentious idea that westernization
and modernization are one in the same. Reformation within modernizing cultures doesn’t necessarily
mean westernizing Arab culture in the Middle Eastern case. In terms of hard rates of modernization
indicators, such as urbanization, education, and industrialization there has been dramatic increases in the
region over the last fifty years (Yousef 2004). As of 2010, World Bank indicators for the MENA region
show that over 62% of people live in cities, nearly 33% of the region’s GDP is derived from value added
industries, and 92% of the population was completing primary school (World Bank 2010).
What impact did modernization have on mobilization in regards to the Arab Spring? This upward
mobilization trend in the MENA has had political implications many of which have been theorized
before. The modernization literature that deals with developing countries argues that as modernization
occurs, a society will evolve from its traditional bounds as new bonds are formed between the modern
state and the population with the end goal of democratization (Huntington 1968) (Moore 1967). This is
the observable implication of higher demands for democracy and reform as per Salih’s argument of the
Arab Spring causes. However, this societal evolution is not without its costs as friction occurs with
“…rapid social change and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow
development of political institutions” (Huntington 1968, 4). In other words, the process of modernization
will result in the formation of strong, centralized institutions or weak and fragmented ones depending on
whether or not the government can effectively keep up with new societal demands. Importantly,
Huntington notes that monarchs will be unable to sustain the new demands of society and presents the
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“king’s dilemma” wherein monarchies will sacrifice more and more power into eventually becoming
obsolete (Huntington 1968, 177).
While modernization theory holds that modernity is an inevitable consequence of time, good
government is not (Moore 1967). The process of establishing a centralized, autonomous government is
not always clear and easily attainable. Joel Migdal identifies the folly of newly independent states
attempting to emulate the Western centric modernization thesis when post-colonial histories are
considered (Migdal 1988). In the context of the Middle East, early decisions by political leaders to
modernize to republicanism or sustain traditional monarchist governments led to future institutional
consequences (Owen 1992, 21). This could be because of cultural compatibilities or the innate ability of
certain countries to build good governance. The cultural compatibility argument will be addressed more
below.
Utilizing the modernization perspective, the literature provides several perceived outcomes for
republics and monarchies. Firstly, it contends that republics will last longer because they rely on electoral
institutions (Lust 2006), and that monarchs will not be able to keep up with the demands of modernization
and thus fail (Huntington 1968). Instead, the literature has been demonstrated to be unsubstantiated given
the Arab Spring’s destruction of republican regimes and the persistence of monarchism in the region. One
should recall the arguments of Geddes mentioned above regarding systemic features of mixed regimes
and how this leads to a more survivable context than monarchies. However, the facts prove otherwise
after 2010 which is doubly intriguing given the rates of modernity between republics and monarchies.
Modernization has occurred at disparate rates in all countries and the MENA is no exception to this fact.
Certainly it could be argued that republican states have enjoyed more of the discombobulating societal
problems associated with modernizing while the monarchies have enjoyed higher economic prosperity
indicators.
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Table 2.1 GCC’s GDP per Capita Compared to Other Regions
Country Name
Qatar
North America
Kuwait
Euro Zone
United Arab Emirates
Saudi Arabia
Bahrain
Oman
Central Europe and the Baltics
Latin America & Caribbean
East Asia & Pacific
Middle East & North Africa (excluding GCC)
Yemen, Rep.

2011
$88,050.81
$50,016.96
$47,551.38
$40,611.32
$39,901.22
$23,256.10
$22,033.91
$21,164.34
$13,885.17
$10,007.82
$8,847.16
$4,667.07
$1,350.38

The modernization literature doesn’t alone answer the question of this thesis. It provides some
insight into the notion of expected results when modernization comes to a region of recently independent
states but its predicted outcomes have proven to be invalidated. Huntington’s “king’s dilemma” has yet to
confirm his prophesized consequences for either the GCC states nor Morocco or Jordan. In fact, many of
the GCC states have used their enormous rent prosperity to attain high levels of per capita wealth on par
with developed western states with comparable lifestyles. Table 2.1, posted above, lists the GDP per
capita by region against the GCC states (World Bank 2017). The results show that the GDP per capita
wealth of countries like the UAE and Kuwait are on par with the developed countries of the Euro zone.
Qatar stands out as an extreme outlier with one of the highest GDP per capita in the world. Certainly this
can be explained by extremely small populations in these countries but this doesn’t clarify the whole
picture. States like Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE have diversified their economies into logistical hubs that
compete on a global scale (Herb 2014). This underscores the transformative level of modernization that
has occurred within these kingdoms and, yet, there were little to no protests during the early 2010’s.
Perhaps these states avoided the social ramifications of labor dynamics by having been funded by easily
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extractable oil reserves. Snyder disagrees with this sentiment by pointing to the rejection of socialism and
nationalism within these regimes as a more tangible explanation.
As modernization and desire for reform can’t alone account for ascertaining why political
changes occurred where they did during the Arab Spring I move beyond this variable and investigate the
economic consequences. From the economic literature I contend an institutional structure that is erected
within MENA countries had consequential effects long after they were established. From this perspective,
problems facing republics such as redistribution of wealth (Owen 2012) can be weighed against what
makes monarchs better suited for state building and efficacy of government in the long run (Anderson
1991).
2.3

Institutional Choice and Government Efficacy
The economic and social ramifications of building institutions within different regime types have

become clearer. Modernization drives social consequences within the context of republicanism or
monarchism because the structure that each one relies on creates or mitigates these desires. For republican
states, legitimacy was tied to nationalism and ideology which created cohesion problems between social
groups. The monarchies were less apt to rely on nationalism and have faced less social protests as a result
given the nature of the Arab Spring. However, how do these structures impact the economic situation
preceding the Arab Spring? Salih has already contended that the economic scenario played a pivotal
structural factor in causing the 2011 revolution from below (Salih 2013). If one compares the economic
data between MENA regimes in 2010, on the eve of the Arab Spring, a clear pattern is visible: the
monarchies were performing much better overall than their republican neighbors (see Table 2.2 below
pulled from the same World Bank data set as Table 2.1). Certainly a pattern exists between monarchism
and republican states as far as GDP per capita wealth is concerned.2 The weakest economically
performing monarchy, in regards to GDP per capita variables (Saudi Arabia), out earns the highest
earning republican state, Libya, by nearly $7000. While Libya has substantial oil reserves to increase this
2

Note that no Data was included for Syria per this year in the World Bank dataset.
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value, Saudi Arabia has twice the population count making the contrast even starker. The difference of
$18,000 per capita wealth between this table and Table 2.1 for Qatar highlights just how much economic
growth monarchic regimes were experiencing during one year’s time.
Table 2.2 GDP per Capita as Compared between Arab Countries in 2010 (in US Dollars)
Country Name
Algeria
Bahrain
Egypt
Iran
Iraq
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Morocco
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Sudan
Tunisia
United Arab Emirates
Yemen

2010
$4,473.49
$20,386.02
$2,668.04
$6,299.92
$4,487.37
$4,054.27
$37,725.14
$8,763.80
$11,933.78
$2,857.67
$19,920.65
$70,870.23
$18,753.98
$1,421.53
$4,140.44
$34,341.91
$1,310.05

The economic destitution of the republican states in the early 2010’s heralded their own doom
and certainly the data would bear this out as “Financial pressure top every list of catalysts and causes of
the Arab Spring…” (Salih 2013, 187). The economic crash of the late 2000’s meant less foreign financial
aid and investments which the Arab regimes had to contend with. Salih argues the economic situation as
contemptible within the republics but doesn’t really highlight how this problem impacts the local citizens
desire to mobilize or for them to actively seek out change. Ogbonnaya insightfully links this issue by
tying it to how the economic woes impacted each state’s ability to provide for its citizens (Ogbonnaya
2013). In other words, the economic stagnation manifests itself as a causal variable as a result of
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structural antecedents that impact government efficacy, or the ability for the government to provide and
meet the needs of its citizenry.
Not only was the desire to change the economic conditions a prime factor of the Arab Spring so
too was the desire to escape the economic structural constraints associated with the Arab republics.
Emmanuel Martin contends that the pressures and desires for economic freedom from both corrupt
leaders and ailing economies is a somewhat overlooked factor of this movement (Martin 2012). Martin
asserts that the initial event, the self-immolation of the Tunisian street vendor Mohammed Bouazizi, had
the demonstrative tone of an entrepreneurial spirit reacting to the repressive grip of state ran economic
cronyism (Martin 2012, 94). Further, this extreme act contrasts within a country where most citizens
depend on the state for employment opportunities, unemployment was extensive, and bureaucracy
suffocates independent business owners (Martin 2012). Throughout the MENA, Tunisia is the rule not the
exception.
Figure 2.1 highlights the comparative realities by assessing unemployment between a select
group of MENA countries leading up to 2010 as provided by the World Bank datasets. The data
highlights trends since 1991 between the monarchies of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan as compared
against the republics of Tunisia, Iraq, and Lebanon providing a mix of states adversely affected by the
Arab Spring and different levels of oil wealth and population sizes. The monarchs, tended to have a much
lower percentage of unemployment over the twenty year period but there were exceptions to this rule.
Jordan, with its lack of oil wealth, followed Tunisia’s trend in high unemployment but to different results:
Jordan resisted the Arab Spring while Tunisia’s Ben Ali was forced to abdicate. Finally, the case of Iraq
demonstrates that oil wealth fails to resist high levels of unemployment with a nearly 16% unemployment
rate in 2010. This level is comparable to the unemployment rate in Iraq before the 2003 US led invasion
and subsequent spike.
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Figure 2.1 Unemployment Rate per Select MENA Countries
With a ratio of nearly 1.3 public workers per private, both monarchic and republican states share
a penchant for high levels of government employment (Bteddini 2012). However, there is more to this
data then just comparable numbers. Economic structure could explain a great deal as to why the
monarchies of the Arab world were largely immune to the mass mobilization and desires for economic
change despite shared unemployment problems. Perhaps there didn’t exist a need for a Bouazizi type
event to dramatically challenge the status quo in the monarchies. Some authors, like Michael Ross, would
argue that monarchies of the Gulf were able to drown out the opposition by spending more on their
populations but this doesn’t account for the countries of Jordan and Morocco who lacked such ability to
draw on cash flows from oil. The economic structuring of MENA regimes, like all regimes, and their
institutions played a part. To answer the question of Arab monarchic resilience, I look into these
institutions as an indicator of whether these particular states are possibly creating stronger economies but
first I look at the theoretical argument of why decisions are made to create these structures in the first
place.
What the aforementioned institutional literature has established is a pattern of structural
compatibility with effective governance. How a country forms its political institutions has a lot of
influence over how effective the state will be. As Lisa Anderson states, “…monarchy is particularly well
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suited to the requirements of state formation, especially in its early stages” as it can produce incremental
changes as compared to the extreme, revolutionary republics (Anderson 1991, 4). For republics, this
translates into who retains power as the original elite of a prerevolutionary state are shaken up via the
plebiscite revolution “…in the name of redistributive reform” (Hinnebusch 2006, 380). For nascent Arab
republics, they undertake cross-class inclusion into electoral decision making following nationalization
and import substitution policies (Snyder 2015) to support the state’s reliance on pluralism. This pluralistic
method endemic in the republics requires an electoral process for redistributing goods and services:
constituent-clientelism (Waldner 1999). Waldner explains, “Constituent-clientelism typically results from
a rapid extension of political participation…” as a means to combat future challenges to the regime
through extensive side payments (Waldner 1999, 40). “Class specific goods,” Waldner continues, “are
impersonally exchanged for loyalty to the state,” and are reflected by the electoral dynamics in that
country (Waldner 1999, 39). For instance, elected officials will have a constituency they depend on for
support and, in return, provide goods, jobs, and services to, but, this relationship comes at the cost of
liberal economic interests (Waldner 1999, 97).
In the case of the monarchs, it is not that side payments are not initiated, but that they don’t
implement constituent-clientelism. Instead, when the oil rich monarchies can afford it, they spend their
rent wealth nationally and in a largely inclusive manner (Ross 2012). An added benefit of not relying on
constituent-clientelism is that by spending this wealth it does not come at the expense of the economic
elites (Hinnebusch 2006, 379). In other words, they distribute wealth rather than redistribute it. It doesn’t
matter that there could be a constituent based relationship that exists within a state as long as this
association isn’t the vehicle to redistribute wealth between different class groups. Even in the case of
Kuwait, who has a somewhat strong parliamentary system, constituent-clientelism isn’t adopted as oil
revenues are distributed nationally rather than on a constituent basis (Herb 2014).
In monarchies, they instead rely on a more direct form of allocating goods and services that favor
economic elites instead of the general population. This expedient form of patronage, which Waldner
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refers to as “patron-client(elism)”, within the monarchic system ensures loyalty to the individual leader,
rather than the state (Waldner 1999, 39). The largely exclusive nature, as compared to the class-based
electoral republics, bypasses the fracturing demands of different groups and leads to stronger state
institutions as a result (Waldner 1999). In republics, constituent-clientelism lends state formation to a less
centralized network of wealth sharing where the state is separated by a system of tightly controlled
bureaucracies that redistributes goods and services while the security apparatus orbits and protects the top
tier elites (Waldner 1999). The elected officials in these states act as mediators, or gatekeepers, in
connecting constituents with these goods or a corruptive tool to bypass the bureaucracy all together.
Yom and Gausse reaffirm Waldner’s argument presented in the previous paragraphs as they
advocate that monarchical survival is conditioned by the creation of cross-cutting coalitions (Gauss and
Yom 2012). This sentiment is in line with de Mesquita and selectorate theory which puts government
efficacy and survival within coalition dynamics. Selectorate theory argues that every regime rules by a
select group of elites (the selectorate) but that this group will be different sizes and interchangeable to
varying degrees by the larger citizenry (de Mesquita and Smith 2011). In monarchies, the ruling elite are
at their smallest and the selectorate typically encompasses economically interested elites that the regime
depends on to maintain political power and legitimacy (de Mesquita and Smith 2011). On the other hand,
republics have a much larger selectorate that is almost universally replaceable by the larger citizen base.
Not only does this create different coalition dynamics but it also influences the loyalty of the selectorate
to the regime in regards to how the regime organizes its side payments (Hinnebusch 2006, 382). All
selectorates have to “buy off” their political base through the asymmetrical distribution of goods and
services to maintain loyalty to the regime (de Mesquita and Smith 2011). For the narrow coalition present
in monarchies, they guarantee economic prosperity to their elite centered selectorate. This is in stark
contrast to the populist centered, broad coalitional demands of the republics which requires redistribution
of wealth between the classes (de Mesquita and Smith 2011).
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The selectorate argument provides a basis as to why some states structure themselves to either
favor economic elites or redistribute goods on a cross-class need. The cross-class coalition of republics
versus the economically minded alliance within monarchies creates variance in economic inclinations
between countries. How effective these states are at providing for their populations will become more
apparent when the models are ran and the results are analyzed. The historical evidence favors the Arab
monarchies and whether this variable indicates a statistical correlation shall be observed below.
2.4

Alternative Explanations of Regime Survival
Finally, when one considers the capacity of possible causes and immunities of the Arab Spring it

is important to consider the alternative explanations. In this case, I review the resource curse literature,
youth demographics as arbiters of change, and cultural compatibility between regime types as well as
colonial explanations of bias between which regimes inherited better institutions from their imperial
sovereigns. By investigating the validity that each of these arguments bring, I can be more confident in
the variables I do decide to test in my models.
The ability for an oil rich republic, such as Algeria, to satisfy the high demands for side payments
can be achieved through an abundance of easily exploitable resources. In the case of the oil rich Gulf
monarchs, the resource curse argument contends that oil deflates the demands of the social contract
between the governed and the governor by dismantling the need for taxation and, as a result, diminishes
the outcry for representation (Ross 2001). Functionally, this typically takes the form of distributing the oil
wealth (as opposed to redistribution) and by purchasing the loyalty of its citizens or even the entire
population in the case of the smaller monarchies (Schwarz 2008, 609). The “al-bay’ah”, or allegiance to
the state is transformed with the promise of goods and services such as employment and entitlements in
exchange for a citizen’s loyalty and political silence (Al-Farsi 2013, 1). However, this is not to be
confused with the constituent-clientelism argument as resources are allocated, not redistributed, and are
funneled along national lines rather than on an electoral basis. Oil rents only provide the state with more
purchasing power to consolidate political authority. As Mehran Kamrava explains, the extent of these
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state’s security apparatuses, funded by oil wealth, allowed them high levels of coercive capacity
(Kamrava 2012, 97) but oil isn’t the only explanation of political power in these regimes.
Despite the extensiveness of the resource curse literature it has its limitations. The literature is
effective at contending with oil rich countries that break the mold, such as why absolute monarchs exist in
the Gulf, but they provide no insight on kingdoms like Jordan and Morocco. The resource curse literature
claims that the resource rich states are often less centralized, arguably weaker, and strain to emit control
over the entire state (Schwarz 2008, 609). This logic seems incompatible given oil funded monarchic
sustainability in the region, especially compared to the track records of their republican neighbors.
Instead, one should view resource abundance as an interactive variable that skews the expected results
further from the trend, but is not the sole factor in achieving that outcome (Hinnebusch 2006).
Another alternative perspective to take into account is the large proportion of young people
within the Arab states with around sixty percent of the region’s population under the age of thirty
(Hoffman and Jamal 2014). The depressed economic condition has created an unstable concoction of few
opportunities and jobs combined with an increasing change of attitudes towards liberalization (Hoffman
and Jamal 2014). Use and integration of new technologies and social media platforms as a means to
mobilize is certainly a factor worth noting as well. Marc Lynch writes in response to filming and
disseminating violent regime crackdowns online on sites such as Facebook and Youtube had the dual
purpose in that “…it simply bore witness…” and “forced knowledge of the atrocities into the public
sphere…” (Lynch 2014, 102).
Jamal and Hoffman utilizes comparative data between different cohorts across the Arab world
using the Arab Barometer data to show that there is a statistical correlation between the youth who are
more likely to be educated, and unemployed and their propensity to protest (Hoffman and Jamal 2014).
However, this data doesn’t explain the lack of protests in the Arab kingdoms. The trend of unemployed
youth isn’t isolated to just the republican regimes and is shared by most of the MENA states as had been
observed in Figure 2.1 above. There is a lack of discrepancy between the different countries when it
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comes to availability of youth cohorts to conduct protests despite the presence of large, young, and
urbanized populations that make for a capable population to mobilize (Schwartz 2011). What youthful
populations can’t explain is why and where these protestations will occur in the first place.
A more simple explanation of effective state institutions and resilience in monarchies rather than
republics could lie in the historical-cultural and colonial explanations. Certainly history and culture play a
large role in determining outcomes for any region and Arab states are no exception to this rule. The
economic decline of a once prosperous region and complimentary rise of Western Europe left the Middle
East in a particularly weak position after the Ottoman Empires collapse at the start of the 20th Century
(Kuran 2012). The sheer influence that the victorious allied powers had presents an interesting puzzle of
European derived outcomes that are still visible within the region. As Lisa Anderson writes, “The
prevalence of monarchies in the Middle East is best understood as a reflection of the vagaries of historical
accident” (Anderson 1991, 3). Path dependent arguments of colonial history provide some indication of
future outcomes as French and British favoritism towards regime types and influence over social
dynamics are still largely observable today. Anderson writes that British support for strong, centralized
monarchies echoes in their successes, as monarchy is a traditional style of government and so does well in
the patriarchal societies that constitute the Arab kingdoms (Anderson 1991, 2). Roger Owen buttresses the
argument that the British reliance on centralized bureaucracies with a monarch at the center would be
especially beneficial to the nascent state’s post colonial needs (Owen 1992).
The simple explanation is often the least satisfying, however. Historical incident doesn’t alone
account for survival via state effectiveness, only initial starting points. The monarchs of Iraq, Iran, Egypt,
and Libya were crushed under the weight of modernization and progress via coups and revolutions
despite Arabian patrimonialism and colonial endowment. And, in spite of the prevalence of
authoritarianism in the region, many Arab citizens have favorable opinions of democracy (Hinnebusch
2006, 374). While traditional cultural values pervade much of the region, it is easy to see how Islam
would be an indicator that reinforces these norms but it doesn’t explain how norms on cultural
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expectations can change. In a recent study of individual attitudes towards women’s rights in the Middle
East, it was found that gender relations are modernizing despite the previous prevalence of literal
Quaranic interpretations of women’s rights (Kostenko, Kuzmuchev and Punarin). Still, culture and
modernization seems at odds, nonetheless, in the Middle East and path dependent Weberian models of
state building seem at odds with Islam, or, at least, Weber “…ignored many of the questions” associated
with its compatibility (Nafissi 1998, 193).

3

CASE STUDY: A BRIEF CASE STUDY OF THE ARAB SPRING

This paper has already highlighted some of the approximate causes of the 2011 Arab protests as
being economic and social issues associated with modernization and economic stagnation. What began as
protests against Tunisian president Ben Ali quickly spread across the borders jumping from country to
country. It would be fair to say that no state was completely immune to this movement but the levels of
protests were extremely disparate. This section of the paper highlights a brief case study of the Arab
Spring split along regime lines between monarchies and republics. First, I examine the fall of the Arab
presidents in 2011 and what outcomes that had for the region. Finally, I present how the Arab monarchies
remained resistant to the winds of change while addressing the outlier case of Bahrain. From this case
analysis, my rationale for using the two regime types will become more explicable as a way to orient this
paper.
3.1

Arab Republics and Protest Successes
Despite the progress the protests made in MENA republican states, only Yemen, Tunisia, Libya,

Egypt, and Syria faced serious regime destabilizing protests. In this section, I focus on the presidential
states, including Libya, to observe what effects this monumental movement had on these countries. To do
so, I lay out how the protests evolved and spread over time, how the regimes reacted, and finally what
acted as a catalyst for their eventual downfall. Afterwards I analyze what ultimately became of these
states and, lastly, I look into why the other republican states did not experience protests. Countries like
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Iraq, Algeria, and Lebanon didn’t experience strong political mobilizations and this fact must be rectified
with the rest of this paper’s argument as to why.
While the self-immolation of Bouazizi on January 4th, 2011 may have been the spark that
triggered events in Tunisia, the quick exit by President Ben Ali, ten days later, emboldened many of the
protesters in neighboring countries. In Egypt, Syria, Yemen, and Libya protestors took to the streets in
“Days of Rage” challenging the regime through staged, well organized protests. While protests against
these regimes were nothing new to the region these organized attacks had novel concepts behind them.
For instance, social media played a new and pivotal role in organizing and coordinating demonstrations
and sharing footage of the event with the outside world (Lynch 2014). This organization and a penchant
to occupy highly visible spaces, like Tahrir Square in Egypt’s capital of Cairo, brought highly visible
attention to the mobilization. Other instigating features were unique to specific countries and should be
counted here as well. Egypt had experienced a parliamentary election in 2010 which saw the regime lose
considerable number of seats forcing Mubarak to nullify the results. Roger Owen exposes another
important variable in that the presidential regimes were aging considerably bringing to the forefront the
issue of familial succession (Owen 2014).
These now embattled leaders across the MENA reacted in typical fashion: with violence and
aggression. This is especially true in Egypt and Tunisia where gangs of regime loyalists and security
forces would attack protestors in an attempt to break their resolve. In Syria and Libya, wholesale military
action on the part of the regimes was conducted and protests turned into civil war. This split in use of
military security forces would be fortuitous in predicting the outcomes. In Yemen, Tunisia, and Egypt the
military refused to aggress against the protestors and instead sided against the regimes (Brownlee,
Masoud, and Reynolds 2015). In these instances, the long reigned rulers of Saleh of Yemen, and Ben Ali
of Tunisia chose to retreat into exile in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia while Mubarak faced imprisonment
for crimes committed during his reign. In Libya and Syria, conflict degenerated into all out civil war as
the security forces and military stayed, in large part, with the regimes.
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The military entrenchment of Libya’s Ghaddafi and Syria’s Al-Bashar culminated into a bloody
civil war. The conflict in Libya came to an apogee via NATO military intervention which led to
Ghaddafi’s overthrow, capture and murder. However, Syria’s conflict labored on as pressure from AlBashar’s allies, namely Russia, has kept western armed forces from recreating a Libyan type capitulation
event. The ability to rebuild and transition within the states that experienced political change has also
been asymmetrical. Libya and Yemen followed a similar path in that transitional governments failed to
take hold and tribalistic tensions devolved these states into conflict. Egypt had some early successes in
transitioning to a more democratic state with the election of Mohamed Morsi as the new president.
However this democratic wave was short lived when the Egyptian armed forces shut down the civilian
government and installed Abdel Sisi as the new interim leader. Of all the state to experience the Arab
Spring in its full force, only Tunisia successfully transitioned to a more democratic state and resist
recapture by old regime forces.
Interestingly, not all republican states in the MENA experienced high levels of Arab Spring
protests. The countries of Algeria, Iraq, and Lebanon were less impacted than their presidential neighbors.
One argument exists that contends these states had already experienced years of civil war prior to the
Arab Spring events and the regimes that existed at the time were reflective of this fact (Owen 2014). The
civil wars in Lebanon and Iraq were especially violent and predicated on the basis of sectarian lines which
meant the regimes that came after were meant to pacify these grievances. The Algerian civil war of the
1990’s too had repercussions that reverberated in the regime that created a unique inoculation to the
spread of the Arab Spring in its full force. In Iraq, however, spillover from the Syrian civil war created
new levels of conflict instead of a wave of democratization and instigated the formation of a rebel
government in the form of the Islamic State of the Levant. The conflict, just as in Syria, is still being
fought to this day.
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3.2

Arab Monarchies and Resistance to Protest
While the republican states in the MENA experienced the brunt of the protests, the Arab

monarchies felt varying levels of anti-regime demonstrations too. The small island country of Bahrain
may stand out as an outlier but fellow GCC states as well as Morocco and Jordan had to deal with the
spillover effects of the Arab Spring. This section lays out what occurred in these countries as well as
provides an analysis as to what the timeline of events. To do so, I start by writing out the chronology of
the Arab Spring in relation to the republican protests as well as the overall turnouts for change by
examining the broad motivations for mobilization in these countries. Next, I examine how the monarchies
responded and how this contrasted with their republican neighbors by cracking down on specific leaders
and promising reforms and payoffs. Finally, I examine the outlier case of Bahrain and how it followed a
pattern of protest that was antithetical to the ones in republican states as it was motivated by sectarian
issues that plague the state.
The spread of protests from Tunisia had also infiltrated the monarchies of the Middle East in
early 2011. However, while the protests in republican states were animated for democratic change and
resistance to the presidential succession crises the protests in the Arab monarchies were more motivated
for gradual reform, and ethnic and sectarian issues. For instance, Morocco, Jordan and Oman all
experienced calls for reform which the kings were happily able to oblige by dismissing ministers and
promising reform, albeit gradual. This was in spite of weak showings by protest groups and was
characterized as mostly a mechanism to resist making the situation worse (Owen 2014). In Saudi Arabia,
despite small demonstrations in its Eastern provinces, promises to conduct municipal elections later that
year as well as economic concessions such as pay raises reduced further calls to mobilize in this country.
Much of the protests in the Saudi Arabia were motivated by Shia citizens pushing for more rights within
the Sunni majority country. Even in Kuwait, which is largely Sunni, Shia and Bedouin minority groups
led much of the protests against the government.
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Not only were the motivations for protesting uniquely different in the Arab monarchies, so too
were the kingdom’s responses. The kings replied to the possible threats of regime destabilizing
mobilization in near similar fashion: they offered reforms and economic incentives while also suppressing
opposition leaders. As mentioned in the previous paragraph the MENA monarchies dangled the carrot of
reform. Those countries that had parliaments like Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, and Morocco the kings extended
offers to embolden these institutions with more powers as a quick fix to deescalate any calls for change.
Even in Saudi Arabia, where the monarch rules in absolutist fashion, offers for electoral concessions were
made. This unique ability to concede gradual reform, as Owen notes, wasn’t necessarily genuine in
commitment to actually following through on these promises (Owen 2014). Many states were quick to
renege on their offers as the Arab Spring winded down by 2012. Nor were Arab monarchies committed to
peaceful resolution. Opposition leaders that continued to rally against the regimes faced severe
crackdowns and political violence.
The commitment to regime survival through violent means is most evident in the Bahraini case.
The only monarchy to experience mass mobilization that threatened regime collapse, Bahrain presents an
interesting puzzle by bucking the government typology trend seen during the Arab Spring. This curious
case followed patterns of protest motivations shared by Arab monarchies in that it was largely motivated
by sectarian issues but also had republican conceits as well. The situation in 2010 was comparable to the
Egyptian case in that Bahrain had experienced a parliamentary election that year which saw significant
gains for Shia opposition leaders. The minority Sunni regime led by the Al-Khalifa family responded to
the gains made by the opposition by nullifying the election results. Fortune put this period in conjunction
with the Arab Spring and mass mobilization resulted. Akin to the Egyptian scenario, protestors occupied
Pearl roundabout in the center of Manama, the capital, with the intention of extracting concessions from
the government. Unlike the Egyptian case, however, the military forces sided with the regime as they
were largely staffed by loyal Sunnis. With the help of security forces from GCC states, Bahraini troops
moved in and violently seized back the roundabout a month later ending the Arab Spring in that country.
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4

THEORY: EXPLANING MONARCHICAL SURVIVAL IN THE MENA

The case analysis of the Arab Spring has presented some empirical evidence which points to
regime type correlating to the level of protests. While economic and risk of democratization in rapidly
modernizing countries have been argued as possible culprits, I suggest a third variable that articulates the
mechanism that created environments conducive for protest. The purpose of this next section is to
highlight what theoretical mechanism might be at work that is exhibited in the structures of monarchies
and not in republics. Furthermore, it seeks to discover how this mechanism binds attitudes and creates
different opportunities for dysfunction and instability throughout the MENA.
Institutional failures aren’t limited to regime types but certainly a pattern exists as to which states
perform better and the MENA during the Arab Spring is no exception this. As stated in the opening
paragraphs, my suspicion that regime efficacy being an important aspect of the structural resistors to
MENA protests followed Waldner’s theory of constituent- and patron-clientelism. His argument
distinguishes why some regimes are more effective at governing than others through the building of
nascent institutions that create feedback mechanisms that stabilize or deteriorate overtime. To build off
this theory I separate my argument into two parts: one that considers republican arrangements and the
other that considers monarchies. While establishing the theoretical position of this paper I also ascertain
several assumptions that are considered for this argument to explain the constituent-clientelist
phenomenon. Finally, I propose several testable hypotheses as to what observable implications the
argument has in the Middle East.
4.1

Waldnerian Theory of Nascent Regime Building
Theoretically, I propose that monarchies are more effective in rule because they rely on patron-

clientelism and as a result have a smaller coalition driven by elites who are economically invested.
Therefore they are more resistant to the winds of change and the destabilizing whims of plebiscite
revolutions such as the Arab Spring. This small internally driven coalition creates a feedback mechanism
where economic viability is pivotal to keeping this coalition happy, reinforcing the regime’s stability
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through this causal chain. In other words, the economic elites invest in the regime and the regime invests
in the elites creating a mutually binding agreement of survival where one’s gain and losses are shared
(though not on an equitable basis).
The reasoning behind monarchies relying on smaller coalitions is explained through the first
assumption of this paper: that regime coalition dynamics follows a rational choice logic akin to
selectorate theory and that economic demands, as noted above, are of paramount concern in this system.
A patron-clientelist relationship is conditioned by the initial decisions made by a state as it is developing
to bind the legitimacy of its regime within this economically stratified class. When the nascent regime
chooses to rely on a narrow set of economic elites, it forms institutions protecting economic interests,
such as property rights, because those elites are interested in those rights. The elites within the grace of
the ruler benefit while those without seek to join for the economic gains associated. What’s more, the
selectorate is easily manageable as interchangeable business minded elites can be swapped out to
maintain loyalty to the ruler. Menaldo summarizes the monarchic strategy thusly:
“A monarchic political culture has promoted cohesion among regime insiders, such as
ruling families and other political elites, and bolstered their stake in the regime. Moreover, this
unique political culture has provided the region’s monarchs with legitimacy: regime outsiders
have benefited from the positive externalities associated with secure property rights for the
political elite sustained economic growth and increased economic opportunities. This has helped
monarchs consolidate their authority and foster political stability.” (Menaldo 2012, 709)
Compare this argument to the constituent-clientelism of the Arab republics and a different picture
begins to emerge. The republics created and relied more heavily on broad, cross-class coalitions centered
on redistribution of wealth to sustain their legitimacy. The state is dedicated to protecting the local
population “from the vagaries of the market” as a tool of legitimizing their rule (Waldner 1999, 44). As
stated in the literature review on the topic of institutions in republics the broad coalitions that these
republican states were built on was a part of their founding nationalistic ideology. Cross-class, populist
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support requires a mechanism like constituent-clientelism as a necessity to meet the enlarged demand for
side payments which republics do so by implementing local and national councils and parliaments to meet
regional demands for goods and services. In addition, while monarchs can suppress individual elites more
readily by threatening to withdraw its patronage from those elites who would challenge them presidential
leaders are limited in this regard. Owen writes that the reliance on “…the appearance of constitutional
legality supported by managed elections…” as fundamental to the republic’s legitimacy scheme and is
difficult to break without consequences (Owen 2014, 174). Instead, when problems arise from failure to
manage the opposition, presidential regimes will rely on violent oppression further alienating its citizens
(Menaldo 2012).
This argument does not contend that monarchism and legislatures are exclusive of each other.
While the use of the term “constituent” in constituent-clientelism implies a representative system, it is
important to recognize the particulars of what each parliament provides between monarchies and
republics. The argument instead follows a very narrow line that regimes have readily distinguishable
features that are patron-based or constituent-based. In republics, they act as a system for redistributing
wealth and are consequently a class conscious tool for the plebiscite to gain access to goods and services
(Waldner 1999). Ghandi and Przeworksi view this relationship between ruler and legislature as beneficial
and regard the challenges to authoritarian regimes as being from within (elite driven) and without
(societal) (Gandhi and Przeworksi 2007, 1280). Their argument for including parliaments, therefore,
explains how a mixed regime can satisfy both sets of internal and external challengers. I contend that this
isn’t the whole picture, and, instead I suggest one looks at the economic consequences a parliamentarian
institution has. If the legislature acts purely on the basis as a tool for redistribution of wealth, which the
Arab republics do, then I predict that negative consequences are a result. Whereas a monarchy can rely on
some form of parliamentary system, which many Arab states do, such as Jordan, Kuwait, and Morocco,
and the outcome will be different because it is merely a tool for co-opting opposition and venting
democratic frustrations. This is even evident in the case of Kuwait where Michael Herb notes in The
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Wages of Oil that the parliament is actually quite powerful for a country that many consider to be an
absolute monarchy (Herb 2014). The parliaments in monarchies are, instead, a tool to aggregate political
power between the elite and executive to maintain the status quo. Gandhi and Przeworski’s theory fits
here in that the legislature can be a signaling event to regime invested elites that the sultan will not renege
on their promises. However, wealth in these cases is not reallocated for redistribution via parliamentary
gatekeepers. In the case of oil rich monarchies, the wealth is collected and distributed on a citizenship
basis.
4.2

The Theoretical Implications of Clientelism
Constituent-clientelism impacts the efficacy of government in several key ways: it increases the

load for side payment demands, and constrains executives in making decisions. Compare this outcome to
the patron-clientelistic relationship seen in Arab monarchies: the demand for side payments are largely
diminished, and the executive can act unrestrained. The coalition building decisions that nascent regimes
make have future consequences when the regime is unable to meet its coalitional demands which
ultimately leads to dissatisfaction and destabilization in government.
In an obtuse way, the size of coalition arrangements for a regime is going to have implications for
how effectively that state is able to meet the subsequent coalitional load for side payments. The increased
demand for side payments that accompanies constituent-clientelism creates extreme levels of demand that
becomes increasingly difficult for a republican regime to fulfill. The reliance on redistribution of wealth,
nationalized industries, and crony capitalism strains investment opportunities and diminishes economic
growth potential. As Tamir Moustafa argues in regards to Egypt, “…the consolidation of unbridled power
resulted in a severe case of capital flight depriving the economy of a tremendous amount of Egyptian and
foreign private investment” (Moustafa 2008, 132). Beyond capital flight problems, demand for access to
jobs in the public sector or the building of a new hospital, for example, are financially draining and aren’t
effective at stimulating economic growth. The demand for goods and services remains high but the state
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strains to meet them with fewer and fewer resources. With an ever increasing population, as is the norm in
the MENA, it exacerbates the problem with an ever increasing demand over a diminishing supply.
Monarchies are able to avoid this future failure loop in meeting the demands of their selectorate
chiefly because it is so small. These economically motivated elites can be bought off with direct forms of
patronage that are cheap to supply such as exclusive access to building permits and ownership in select
industries which have the added benefit of being effective tools for economic growth (Waldner 1999). In
effect, elites compete amongst themselves for the tiny amount of room the selectorate allows for creating
a more competitive environment. In this system, elite concerns of wealth being captured by the state are
much reduced which has positive economic results. Stephen Hertog notes that the success of the Gulf’s
state owned enterprises (SOE’s) were dependent on not only monarchical decision making but also
because the SOEs were not beholden to populist autocracies forced to redistribute the gains of their
economic fortunes (Hertog 2010, 263).
The politicized nature of the distribution has an effect on the efficiency and ultimately citizen
satisfaction in which the government can operate by impacting their bureaucracies as well. Waldner notes
that these bureaucracies are the mark of the state evolving from its rawer, mediated form but they have
different implications within different structures (Waldner 1999). For instance, states that rely on
constituent-clientelism will more tightly control their bureaucratic features as a result of their highly
politicized nature. Waldner notes that even if bureaucracies are staffed with skilled technocrats they will
still be beholden to the ruler’s whims (Waldner 1999). Conversely, the small amount of side payments
reduces the need for patron-clientelistic regimes to monitor their bureaucrats. As a result, there is a higher
level of efficiency that accompanies this arrangement which means less waste and a focus on efficacy.
The bureaucracies in republics come with an added benefit of being a monitoring tool and informal spy
network to monitor both agents and the population at large and can be largely viewed as a coercive tool of
the state (Root and May 2008) (Owen 2014). The bureaucracy of the patron-clientelistic system is merely
a tool of expediting economic and other functions of the state. To reinforce the divergence between
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bureaucratic uses, Figure 4.1 shows the “Rule of Law” estimates from the World Bank as compared
between Arab countries. This estimate is scaled from -2, indicating the lowest rule of law score, to 2,
which would be the highest. World Bank describes this statistic as capturing, “perceptions of the extent to
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society… contract enforcement, property
rights, the police, and the courts…” (World Bank 2017, 1). This variable is a great measure of how
effective the judicial system operates within a country and how they protect individual economic rights.
Figure 4.1 paints an extremely stark picture in regards to the rule of law estimate with every republican
state being a negative score. Each kingdom, excluding Morocco, has a positive score indicating that rule
of law is taken much more seriously in these countries. In the case of Morocco, the negative score is
extremely low. Demonstrably, the rule of law is rated higher as monarchs aren’t dedicated to extracting
wealth, but are instead dedicated to the seamless flow of capital within the economy.
1

Rule of Law Estimate

0.5
0
-0.5
-1
-1.5
-2

Figure 4.1 Rule of Law Estimate 2010
Another assumption within this theory that should be addressed is the assessment of how oil
wealth fits into the argument. Despite ruling by an extremely small group of elites that support the regime
in exchange for exclusive goods and services the oil rich monarchies also conduct widespread dispersion
of their rent wealth (Nonneman 2001). This paper assumes that oil acts as an amplifying variable in the
cases where the resource is present in both republics and monarchies. For sultanates, it allows states to
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better fulfill coalition demands by growing the economy but also by moving beyond the selectorate to buy
off the general public with jobs, goods, and services. This is to say that monarchies with oil reach higher
levels of satisfaction in government efficacy and diminish the unfulfilled demands of the elite and lower
classes. The inverse is theorized for republican states due to the constituent mechanism. In the case of
MENA republics with oil, oil wealth is parceled out through constituent needs that reach some but not all
as the demand is larger than what the resource rents can supply creating dissatisfaction and discontent in
the government’s ability. This is visible in states such as Libya, Iraq, and Algeria.
In conclusion, republics may have an advantage in terms of democratic systems to assert
legitimacy but taken as a whole they produce much more fragile institutions compared to the sultanates.
By organizing a clientelistic system around a broad coalition, republics don’t have as much room to
maneuver when problems occur and the penetration of the regime in all aspects of civil life creates a
target of blame for when the system does fail. Rejection of the regime is often indicative of rejection of
the regime leaders themselves. Monarchs, instead, can sacrifice ministers and government officials as
scapegoats and dangle the carrot of reform, albeit gradual reform. Even in Jordan and Morocco, two
monarchies that can’t drown opposition concerns in petrodollars, the ability to offer reform was critical to
their survival during the Arab Spring (Menaldo 2012).
4.3

Hypotheses
Failure to satisfy the demands for goods within a constituent-clientelist or patron-clientelist

system leads to disgruntled populations and the conditions for regime change. Causally, this can occur by
a diminished cost in collective action as more and more people are embittered by ineffectual regimes and
desire change. However, this mechanism also concludes the inverse: satisfactory reviews of regime
performance should conclude a low likelihood of challenges from both above and below occurring to that
regime. This does not account for when or where such phenomenon would occur, though, as it lacks
predictive power of when collective action reaches a salient point to induce protests.
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By applying Waldner’s theory to Middle Eastern countries certain implications arise that I state as several
formalized hypotheses. Firstly, that Arab monarchs are better at meeting the needs of their population and
so their citizens will be more satisfied in the efficacy of their governments. My second hypothesis, then,
contends the inverse in that republics will be less suited at achieving high levels of satisfaction in
government for their citizens. These implications relate to the final hypothesis that I present here: that
possessing oil in a monarchy greatly increases the efficacy of the government’s ability to satisfy popular
needs as well as confounding republican governments in their ability to achieve high levels of satisfaction
in government. In other words, oil is an interactive variable which amplifies either the first or second
hypotheses.
5

DATA AND RESULTS

The theoretical position of this paper is that MENA monarchies were able to effectively meet the
needs of their populations and thus reducing the urge for their citizens to protest or openly revolt. To test
whether this argument is valid, I utilize a specific variable from the Arab Barometers that measures
individual responses to regime effectiveness. First though, I propose testing the initial two variables of
economic outlook and demands for democratization as possible alternative explanations. The previous
literature provided a tight theoretical framework of what should be expected when testing the three
proposed variables that examine the social, economic, and crossover effects. I will highlight the three
specific models and test the two regime types against them. These models are focused on economic
outlook, risk for democratic reform (democratic compatibility), and government efficacy. Furthermore, I
will highlight the logic in testing these three arguments and what real world implications the results
demonstrate.
Testing the three variables is relatively simple given the amount of survey data provided by the
Arab Barometer instruments and I am able to utilize a linear regression model for two of the equations. So
far, three of these surveys have been published but I will only be utilizing two, the ABII and the ABIII, to
explore the empirical evidence that regime types may have instigated or resisted the Arab Spring
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movement. While the ABII was conducted before the height of the Arab Spring, the ABIII was initiated
and published several years later. Since this theory is testing regime types between republic and monarchy
there shouldn’t be any discrepancies despite the ABII and ABIII not sharing each country between them.
Testing the ABII and ABIII models to provide both before and after effects should provide a good
robustness check of my theory as the heightened level of feelings during this period should result in more
critical analysis of state governments. Below, in Table 3.1 I present a breakdown of the countries included
from the ABII and the ABIII as well as additional indicators.
5.1

Data Source and the Three Main Models
The Arab Barometers are a series of surveys that have been conducted from 2008 to 2013 and

have been released in three installments. Each one covers different countries and asks varying questions
though there are similarities between each. It is best described as being, “directed by an international team
of scholars form the Arab world and the United States,” in which the surveyors “conduct(s) face-to-face
interviews based on nationally representative samples of adults eighteen years of age and older” (Tessler
and Robbins 2014, 250). I use the ABII and ABIII data because this period was the most highly
contentious being collected between 2010 and 2013 and covers the widest range of countries with the
highest crossover compatibility between survey questions. I break up the models by referring to ABII submodels with a “(1)” and ABIII sub-models with a “(2)” and can be seen as a measure of before and after
the Arab Spring. Using equations for each of the two datasets allows me to analyze my three dependent
variables against a range of countries which included the monarchies of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan,
and Morocco with Jordan appearing between both surveys. The data yielded on republics included the
countries of Yemen, Algeria, Lebanon, Egypt, Tunisia, Iraq, and Sudan.3 Though data was also available
for both Palestine and Libya I chose not to use them given Palestine’s precarious quasi-statehood status
and Libya’s current status as being a failed state (Engel 2014). Since Egypt, Yemen, and Tunisia both
experienced regime change (twice in the Egyptian case) they were still kept in the overall dataset because

3

The republics provided data from both surveys.
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there was data for them in both 2011 and 2013 surveys to provide a balanced measurement of
government satisfaction during the regime transitions and reestablishment. There is a list of countries
being tested in Table 5.1 below. Critically, I rely on survey data because this provides the most precise
test of attitudes to measure against outcomes in the Arab Spring and determined which variables had more
of an impact.
Table 5.1 List of Countries Providing Data

Country
Algeria
Egypt
Iraq
Jordan
Lebanon
Palestine
Saudi Arabia
Sudan
Tunisia
Yemen
Kuwait
Libya
Morocco

Arab Barometer
II, III
II, III
II, III
II, III
II, III
II, III
II
II, III
II, III
II, III
III
III
III

Regime Type
Republic
Republic
Republic
Monarchy
Republic
Monarchy
Republic
Republic
Republic
Monarchy
Monarchy

Oil
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No

Model one tests how regime types in the MENA do in regards to economic prospects as indicated
by respondents and is split between two equations for ABII and ABIII data. To test this I rely on
“Question 102” from the surveys which asks respondents to rate the expected economic situation of their
country over the next five years.4 This is an excellent opportunity to judge how attitudes of future
economic prosperity can be measured against the two regime types. It is also a great measure of analyzing
how important were economic conditions as a causal mechanism of the Arab Spring. Responses are
measured based of a Likert scale that have been transformed to an ordinal measurement of lowest to
4

Question 102 reads: “What do you think will be the economic situation in your country during the next few years
(3-5 years) compared to the current situation?” Responses ranged from 1. “Much Better” to 5. “Much Worse”. I
inverted the responses to reflect the negative and positive answers accordingly. (Arab Barometer 2012, 9)
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highest for ease of modeling. Since the modeling is using an ordinal scale I will analyze this variable
through a logit model instead of OLS.
The second model is a measurement of risk of democratization in the country as provided by
“Question 512” in both surveys.5 The responses are scaled from a one to ten marking level of democratic
compatibility from least to most compatible. The openness of responses based on this scale allows for
easily interpreting the data with a simple regression model. The use of democratic compatibility is to
provide a proxy measure for the risk of mobilization from below and to assess the validity of the
moderinization thesis against the two regime types. This may not account for all components of Salih’s
variable of social causes but it should capture much of the shared desires for political change across the
MENA countries. This too is split into two equations that measure ABII effects and then ABIII.
For my final model, the dependent variable is an aggregate of ABII and III survey “Question
513”6 which asks the respondent the following question:
“Suppose that there was a scale from 1-107 to measure the extent of your satisfaction with
the government, in which 1 means that you were absolutely unsatisfied with its performance and
10 means that you were very satisfied. To what extent are you satisfied with the government’s
performance?” (Arab Barometer II 2012, 37)
As this model is not bounded by such a small measure of responses and is based on a sliding
scale, I will use OLS as the optimum model to test the data in this case. The data from this survey
question and response should yield an internal metric as to how well the governments of these states are
performing and providing for their citizens. This measure should provide a more approximate measure of

5

Question 512 reads: “Suppose there was a scale from 1-10 measuring the extent to which democracy is suitable for
your country, with 1 meaning that democracy is absolutely inappropriate for your country and 10 meaning that
democracy is completely appropriate for your country. To what extent do you think democracy is appropriate for
your country?” (Arab Barometer 2012, 36)
6
7

Question 513 is worded the same for both surveys (Arab Barometer III 2014, 16).

This is scaled as 0-10 in ABIII with 0 being the lowest. For respondents that rated their governments as “0” I
recoded these as 1.
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how the two previous variables interact on the individual level and induce everyday problems and
responses to government ineptitude. I suspect a pattern will emerge between regime types in the MENA
as to participant responses and reinforce my theses. The first equation provided will give correlates based
on the Arab Barometer II data followed by data for ABIII in the second sub-model. Finally, I run this
same model one more time and examine the results in Model 4. Instead of logged oil wealth, however, I
dichotomize this variable based on possession of a certain threshold of per capita resource rents to then
interact with the regime variable. This is discussed more below.
For my main independent variable I coded a dummy statistic that indicates whether a state is a
monarchy (1) or a republic (0). The information shared in Table 5.1 above indicates which countries are
labeled which and are based, in part, on data provided by Ellen Lust in the book The Arab Spring
Explained (Lust 2014, 221). By utilizing a dichotomous variable for the statistic of interest a correlated
pattern should emerge as to the relationship between regime types and citizen responses within those
three models. Theoretically and logically, there should be no suspicion of endogeneity or reverse causality
occurring within this relationship. However, one issue that may arise is a biased p value due testing
individual level data against aggregate, regime level models. Results may indicate smaller than actual p
values though theoretical directions should be observed as valid.
Table 5.2 Summary Statistics for Variables for ABII and ABIII
ABII
Variable

Observations

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Min

Max

Question 102
Question 512
Question 513
Monarchy
British Colony
Regime Change During Arab Spring

11,870
11,608
11,915
12,362
12,362
12,362

3.19
5.87
4.28
0.32
0.62
0.29

1.32
2.71
2.67
0.47
0.49
0.45

1
1
1
0
0
0

5
10
10
1
1
1

logged GDP per Capita
logged Oil wealth per Capita

12,362
11,162

8.46
3.95

0.87
4.15

7.25
-2.54

10.79
10.16

ABIII
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Variable
Question 102
Question 512
Question 513
Monarchy
British Colony
Regime Change During Arab Spring
logged GDP per Capita
logged Oil wealth per Capita

Observations
10,965
10,393
10,670
11,582
11,582
11,582
11,582
11,582

Mean

Standard
Deviation

3.15
6.06
4.78
0.22
0.55
0.31
8.41
4.72

1.32
2.67
2.6
0.42
0.5
0.46
0.85
3.47

Min
1
1
1
0
0
0
7.16
-2.34

Max
5
10
10
1
1
1
10.05
9.28

By testing these models in a relatively homogenous region I am able to keep many
extemporaneous variables at constant. For instance, all the countries listed are majority Muslim, and Arab
in culture and language.8 Considering this aspect, I still include several confounding variables that could
have more explanatory power in how individuals rate the efficacy of their governments. Firstly, to
account for colonial biases, I institute a dummy variable for whether the country was once a British
protectorate though I suspect a positive relationship will exist only through the historical ties of Britain
favoring strong monarchies. Next, I include a variable to capture economic conditions through the logged
GDP per capita from the past year.9 Also included is a dichotomous variable that indicates whether there
had been recent regime change occurring due to the Arab Spring with the intent on controlling for
whether this is inducing a measurable pattern with respondents. Finally, I provide another lagged variable
of logged GDP per capita of oil wealth, provided by World Bank indicators, on a per state basis. The
purpose of this variable is to capture as much nuance as possible from the impact oil may have on
manipulating favorable attitudes towards regimes. Table 5.2, listed above, provides a list of the summary
statistics for ease of reference.

8
9

Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria are an ethnic offshoot known as Arab-Berbers.

This data was gathered through the World Bank: World Government Indicators of GDP per Capita along with
percent GDP of Oil rents.
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5.2

Model 1: Economic Outlook
As previously stated Question 102 uses a Likert scale with very limited range of

responses and therefore requires an ordered logistic model to fully appreciate the results. First, I run the
data through a cross tabulation to compare regime types and responses as seen in Table 5.3 to follow.
Afterwards I use an ordered logit model and then run the equation through a simulated quantity of interest
test. The results indicate that there may be a correlation between regime type and how individuals
respond to the question of future economic prospects. Economic outlook is a good predictor of future
stability issues and the cross tab demonstrates some evidence for it.
Table 5.3, below, provides some interesting preliminary data to start with. Starting on the far end
of the scale, individuals in republican countries from the ABII data rated the economic outlook of the
country over the next three to five years as “Much Worse” by nearly eight percentage points more. This
trend nearly doubled by respondents following the Arab Spring indicating an amplifying effect may have
occurred. On the other side, monarchy was ahead by almost two percent higher in responses to rating the
economic condition as “Much Better” in the first model but is seven percent higher based on the ABIII
data. Certainly an attitude trend exists between regime types as the results of the cross tabulation are
shown to be statistically significant with less than 1 percent chance of error. Citizens in monarchies rated
the economic outlook of their countries better in both datasets when considering the extreme ends of this
scale, however, the evidence gets murkier when it comes to rating the country’s economic future as
mildly improving, deteriorating, or just staying the same. Critically, this is where much of the responses
are centered as well accounting for over 60% of responses in both regime types in each data set. What’s
more, if one was to separate the responses into an optimistic and pessimistic dichotomy, individuals in
republics and monarchies share similar levels of positive expectations. Another point of validity to these
results is the consistency between the first and second models despite the occurrence of the Arab Spring.
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Table 5.3 Model 1: Cross Tab for Regime Type and Economic Outlook
Question 102

Republic (1)

Monarchy (1)

Republic (2)

Monarchy (2)

1. Much Worse

19.13%

11.85%

19.95%

8.85%

2. Somewhat Worse

12.15%

16.20%

14.11%

12.77%

3. Almost the Same

21.05%

26.73%

20.90%

22.60%

4. Somewhat Better

32.44%

28.01%

30.30%

34.34%

5. Much Better

15.24%

17.20%

14.74%

21.44%

Total
Pearson Chi2 = 124.1645
Pr = 0.00

100.00%

100.00%

100.00%
100.00%
Pearson Chi2 = 283.1753
Pr = 0.00

Running the data through the ordered logistic provides some initial results that seem to indicate
that the survey responses provide some suggestive answers to the question of why the monarchies were so
resistant to the Arab Spring. Table 5.4 shows that monarchy has a positive effect on attitudes in both
models compared to their republican neighbors with high levels of statistical significance. Before the
Arab Spring, monarchies that were surveyed had a 0.716 point difference in the log-odds of moving up
the Likert scale when compared to republican regimes. The relationship is even stronger when
considering responses from countries after the 2011 protests in sub-model 2 with a 1.75 point increase of
responses in the log-odds for monarchies. The spread could be the result of the Arab Spring creating a
bias or the effects of other survey biases. The results are statistically significant but one should consider
the large number of observations as possibly inflating the p values to the 0.01 level. Not surprisingly, the
logged GDP oil wealth per capita of a country has a positive correlation in the log-odds of rating the
economic outlook higher by 0.15 points in sub-model 1 and 0.25 points in sub-model 2. Despite the initial
promise this data yields, it doesn’t tell us much beyond the log-odds of a given categorical change and
therefore requires more investigation.
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Table 5.4 Model 1: Ordered Logistic Estimates of Economic Outlook Probabilities
Question 102

(1)

(2)

0.716*

1.7459*

(0.058)

(0.118)

0.116**

-0.694*

(0.055)

(0.04)

1.1165*

-0.294*

(0.046)

(0.045)

0.0197

-0.375*

(0.045)

(0.058)

0.15*

0.2489*

(0.006)

(0.014)

-0.2829

-4.244

(0.389)

(0.417)

0.5203

-3.2656

(0.388)

(0.416)

1.5635

-2.212

(0.388)

(0.415)

3.2811

-0.5

(0.39)

(0.415)

-16255.2

-15768.5

pseudo R2

0.0495

0.04

Observations

10965

10684

Regime is a Monarchy

Former British Colony

2011 Change of Government

logged GDP per capita

logged Oil Wealth per capita

cut 1

cut 2

cut 3

cut 4

Log likelihood

Standard Errors in parentheses
*p<0.01 , **p<0.05

Finally I run the data through a simulated quantity of interest model to assess the probability of
ratings given regime type. The purpose of this type of test is to simulate all the possible responses and to
provide more accurate correlates and confidence intervals. Before running this model, I first set all the
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variables to their respective means per Table 5.2 to keep ceterus parabus between the values. The results
are listed below in Table 5.5, shown below, and are striking. Interestingly, they indicate there is a
moderate relationship between regime type and whether a respondent rated the economic outlook of the
country positively or negatively. When moving from republican to monarchy (0 to 1) based responses,
attitudes were about eight percent less likely to be “Much Worse” in countries that were surveyed before
the Arab Spring. In the second model, based off the ABIII data, the response is even stronger with a
negative fourteen percent chance. The pattern holds when considering the most optimistic responses from
ABIII data with a 28.8 percent logged likelihood of economic outlooks being rated as “Much Better” in
monarchies than republics. This result compares to the poultry value of only 9.8 percent increase in
likelihood by monarchies surveyed in 2010. The data indicates a statistical significance to the p<0.01
which is possibly a result of large numbers of observations and scoping survey data onto national
variables.
Table 5.5 Model 1: Simulated Quantity of Interest Test for Economic Outlook in Monarchies
Question 102

(1)

(2)

Much Worse

-0.08*

-0.14*

(0.006)

(0.009)

-0.5239*

-0.132*

(0.004)

(0.008)

-0.0448*

-0.126*

(0.005)

(0.0076)

0.079*

0.1098*

(0.005)

(0.0049)

0.098*

0.288*

(0.0092)

(0.0219)

Somewhat Worse
About the Same
Somewhat Better
Much Better
Standard Errors in parentheses
p<0.01

The data provided by Model 1 shows a strong relationship and one that supports Salih
and other’s assessment of the Arab Spring being caused by economic concerns. Just as the cross

49
tabulation indicated that there may be a relationship between regime type and economic prospects as
measured in attitudes the statistical model complimented a similar pattern. Monarchies not only had
higher levels of economic expectations by their citizens but they also outperformed their republican
neighbors when one observes the data from the ABIII survey. However, this doesn’t dismiss my
theoretical position and instead actually supports it. The contention of this paper is that monarchies
perform economically better as a result of the patron-clientelism system which they depend on. Instead,
economic successes should be seen as endogenous to this institutional feature rather than specifically
causal. However, this doesn’t dismiss the effects of forecasted economic prosperity and resistance to the
Arab Spring. To what ends prosperity matters in predicting economic downturns in the economy is
arguable. Counter intuitively, Table 5.4 indicated a negative relationship of 0.37 point change for logged
GDP per capita wealth in monarchies that was also statistically significant to the 0.01 level. Overall
wealth may not have played such a large role in this case after all, but the relationship between
monarchism and economic outlook for prosperity is strong nonetheless.
5.3

Model 2: Democratic Compatibility
To measure risk of democratization between regimes and modernization via proxy, I run regime

types and the control variables against Question 512 to see what levels of correlation can be measured. As
the responses to this are scaled nominally between 1 and 10, I am able to run the data through an OLS
model and interpret the results. As far as whether or not Arab monarchies are more resistant to political
change because desire for democracy in these states is weaker the results follow a pattern that
demonstrates the inverse. Table 5.6 provides the full picture with all the results listed according to each
variable.
When the government is a monarchy, survey respondents indicated that democracy would be an
appropriate style of government by a marginal increase of 0.262 points in the first equation with a
statistical significance of p<0.01. In other words, citizens in republics rated democratic compatibility
lower on average as compared to monarchies by almost 0.3 points. While this value may seem marginal,
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recall that the scale to measure Question 512 exists from 1 to 10. It provides some substantive merit but
not by much. However, when considering the second part of the equation, data provided by ABIII
countries, that estimate is increased to 0.578 points higher in monarchies with a similar level of statistical
significance. The control variables were as well highly statistically significant save for whether a state
was a former British colony and logged GDP per Capita wealth. Further highlights are the effects of the
Arab Spring protests on survey respondents who lived in countries that experienced regime change.
Republican states had a 1.46 point increase in the rating of democratic compatibility indicating that states
like Tunisia and Egypt were highly committed to democratic transition more so than before which was a
negative score of -0.399 points.
Table 5.6 Model 2: Risk of Democratization per Regime Type
Question 512
Regime is a Monarchy
Former British Colony
2011 Change of Government
logged Oil Wealth per capita
logged GDP per capita
Constant
Observations
R-Squared
Standard Errors in Parentheses
* p < 0.01

(1)
0.26197*
(0.0885)
-0.0871
(0.0855)
0.3994*
(0.06879)
-0.0352*
(0.0084)
0.0729
(0.0675)
5.473348
(0.59)
10,393
0.006

(2)
0.57848*
(0.0857)
-0.2204*
(0.0597)
-1.4593*
(0.0671)
0.14718*
(0.0102)
-0.46438*
(0.046)
9.63771
(0.3724)
11,608
0.049

This model indicates that monarchies are not without democratic desires. In fact, these desires are
more pronounced in kingdoms and were amplified after the Arab Spring. Perhaps this is a statistical
assessment of the mixed-regime literature but the facts of the Arab Spring don’t bear this out empirically
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as the Arab kingdoms have been resistant to changes from below. In fact, if the responses from Model 2
provide any indication, it would seem that MENA monarchies would be more likely to be exposed to
mobilization and threats of protest for democratic change. It is true, though, that many kings during the
Arab Spring offered conciliatory reforms of democratization during its early stages as a measure to resist
and pacify before any mass mobilization could occur. Perhaps, as the attitudes of respondents suggest,
this may have resonated within the Arab kingdoms more readily. The modernization thesis seems to be
able to explain changing attitudes in the MENA kingdoms but it still doesn’t explain why these
populations weren’t moved to join in the mass protests that were happening in Egypt and Tunisia.
5.4

Model 3: Satisfaction in Government
The first model that measured economic outlook provided some support for the theoretical

argument that monarchies resist political mobilization by providing better economic futures. However, the
second model indicates a lack of evidence to suggest that structural forces associated with being a
monarchy or republic played a role in causing or inhibiting mass protests in 2011. Salih and other’s causal
argument of socio and economic factors related to changes in attitudes, and modernizing societies don’t
entirely hold up in regards to where protests mobilized and where they did not. Or at least, they don’t
explain why MENA kingdoms didn’t feel much of an impact from desires for democracy in the lower
strata of society. In fact, the data from the previous models indicate that the kingdoms had popular
attitudes that suggested mobilization should have been stronger in these states compared to the republics.
Certainly, the rentier argument would counter that oil wealth played a large role in suppressing any
dissident with violence and coercion. With these results in mind, I carry on to my third model to measure
satisfaction in government, or government efficacy according to responses to survey question “513”.
While this has been theoretically lightly approached by most authors who have studied the Arab Spring
phenomenon, there remains a possible causal relationship that could be responsive and attuned with
answering this thesis’s question.
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Question 513 presents itself on a nominal scale arranged from 1 to 10, similar to Question 512
which allowed me to run this model using OLS without violating any of the Gausse-Markov assumptions.
The results are much stronger than the previous models in terms of substance and offer strong support for
the theoretical relationship that the structures associated with monarchic regimes generate higher levels of
satisfaction in the government and thus depressing the urge or need to protest and mobilize. The statistics
in Table 5.7 indicate that when a MENA regime is a monarchy citizens rate their satisfaction in the
government higher by nearly 2.5 points in sub-model one and 2.33 points in sub-model 2. This is quite a
large and substantive margin and indicates that certainly the institutional structures of monarchy may be
providing for their citizens on a better basis than their republican neighbors. Furthermore, the tight
comparability between scores validates a statistical outcome in which the structural arrangements in
MENA countries are having consistent effects despite the intervention of the Arab Spring. The result is
statistically significant to the p<0.01 level leading me to conclude that the product of this model possesses
a high level of probability. The control variables are statistically significant, save for the variable of being
a former British colony in sub-model one, but are much reduced in the amount of substantive impact they
have at predicting attitudinal measures for Question 513. The logged oil wealth of a country is only
associated with a 0.13 and 0.26 point increase, respectively, in responses between models which is
negligible compared to the effects of regime.
Table 5.7 Model 3: Government Efficiency per Regime Type
Question 513
Regime is a Monarchy
Former British Colony
2011 Change of Government
logged Oil Wealth per capita
logged GDP per capita
Constant

(1)
2.498*
(0.0774)
-0.0602
(0.077)
0.51*
(0.0617)
0.1297*
(0.0075)
-0.22*
(0.061)
5.355

(2)
2.333*
(0.081)
-0.295*
(0.055)
-0.8*
(0.062)
0.258*
(0.0095)
-0.4503*
(0.04312)
6.8337
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Observations
R-Squared
Standard Errors in Parentheses
* p < 0.01

(0.533)
10,670
0.1322

(0.348)
11,915
0.1281

What this data shows is that monarchic regimes are rated higher than their republican
counterparts when accounting for the regime’s ability to provide for its citizenry. This supports my first
hypothesis by a staggering margin. The inverse of the regime values in Table 5.7, -2.5 and -2.33
respectively, conclude that republican states are not able to keep up and fall behind on conducting
effective governance. Whether this was an instigating factor of the Arab Spring is argumentative,
however, the theoretical position of this paper is on track in suggesting that institutional features between
regime types lead to variable outcomes in government efficacy.
5.5

Model 4: Regime Types and Oil Wealth
The third hypothesis of this argument contends that oil wealth will have biasing effects on

different regime types however I have yet to fully test this through the previously presented models. If
true, oil could be treated as an interactive variable along with the dependent statistics of the previous
models. To test this argument, I run Model 3 (Question 513) again but this time with some modifications.
Instead of a logged value of oil wealth I modify this variable into a dummy measure as to whether a state
has oil resources or not. This measure is provided based on Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynold’s analysis of
having at least a thousand dollars of resource rents per capita (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2014,
54). From here, I’m able to easily run the regressions and observe whatever effects are produced. The
model is split between four sub-models with “2” bringing in the interactive term for the ABII data and
likewise for sub-model “4” with the ABIII data.
The results indicate that the third hypothesis of this paper is highly probable. When the two submodels are ran with the dichotomous oil variable the results are even more substantive than when ran with
the logged oil wealth variable in Model 3. According to the ABII data, citizens in monarchies rated their
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government’s ability to meet their needs higher than republics by a value of 3.1 points and 1.6 points
higher than monarchies without oil. In the last sub-model, citizens rated monarchic ability to effectively
meet their needs higher by 2.5 points. This was over point higher than Morocco and Jordan based
responses. While these estimates could be regarded as measures of survey responses from Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait, respectively, there can be little doubt that monarchs who possess large volumes of oil reserve
are more able to provide for their citizenry. The results for the interacted term are statistically significant
with a probability of accepting a false positive result as less than 1 percent.
Table 5.8 Government Efficiency per Regime Type with Oil
Question 513
Regime is a Monarchy
Oil Resources Abundant
Former British Colony
Change of Government During Arab Spring
logged GDP per Capita

(1)
2.2242*
(0.0798)
0.518*
(0.0699)
0.0585
(0.0794)
0.9127*
(0.0617)
-0.0618
(0.0664)

Monarchy with Oil
Constant
Observations
R-Squared
Standard Errors in Parentheses
* p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05

4.325
(0.5764)
10,670
0.1132

(2)
1.532*
(0.0984)
0.1638**
(0.07559)
0.1912**
(0.0797)
0.647*
(0.0653)
-0.214
(0.0672)
1.625*
(0.137)
5.697
(0.584)
10,670
0.1247

(3)
1.725*
(0.066)
2.154*
(0.0765)
0.112**
(0.0495)
0.3888*
(0.0642)
-0.3264*
(0.0392)

5.7003
(0.3165)
11,915
0.1323

(4)
1.586*
(0.0702)
2.087*
(0.0773)
-0.0139
(0.0541)
0.235*
(0.0695)
-0.5624*
(0.0568)
0.9821*
(0.1713)
7.7999
(0.4837)
11,915
0.1346

Rentierist arguments could be seen as validated by these two models in that countries with oil
were rated nearly a point higher than their resource deprived monarchic counterparts. Conversely, this
would mean that republics with oil have a negative correlation in regards to responses to Question 513 by
the inverse of the monarchic values. Since the republican results are amplified by interaction with oil,
respondents in countries like Iraq, and Algeria are much less pleased with their state’s ability to meet
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popular demands, comparably. This evidence seems to suggest that my third hypothesis, that oil causes
monarchies to perform better and republics perform worse, has a high level of validity. The consistency
between the ABII and ABIII results also confirms that these effects are more fixed despite the Arab
Spring.

6

CONCLUSION: BEYOND THE ARAB SPRING

Many arguments have been put forward as to how Middle Eastern monarchies seem to be so
resilient in the area. The Arab Spring should have tested the limits of their institutions to cope with
popular mobilization as it did their republican neighbors. Instead the mobilizations didn’t occur at all.
Salih and other academics have put forward several hypotheses as to why this occurred which suggest that
it was the culmination of social and economic problems that the presidential regimes could not cope with.
However, my examination of the Arab Barometer data taken during this time indicates that desire for
democracy was just as strong and even stronger in monarchic regimes in the MENA. While economic
prospects were much higher in monarchies, per Model 1, this fails to account for why they were better off
as oil can’t account for successes in Morocco and Jordan. I presented an argument that one should look at
the structural arrangements within regime types as a more plausible culprit: that citizens in monarchies
were more satisfied with the regime and, therefore, less interested in its destruction and that the economic
focus of these states have a direct impact on the economic conditions.
The analysis of the literature has pointed largely to the fact that Arab monarchies should have
experienced larger protests during 2011. The data from Model 2 backs this position up showing that
survey responses measuring the risk of desire for democratic reform as being higher in monarchies. While
the results weren’t substantive to a high degree they still indicate that perhaps these attitudes didn’t play
the aggressive role that was hypothesized by authors on the subject in MENA kingdoms. At the very
least, it shows that the causal arrow is more complex, nuanced, and harder to capture using this model.
While Model 1 demonstrated that economic conditions were regarded much higher in Arab monarchies
my theoretical position offers more explanation as to why this is. The third dependent variable that
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examined government efficacy as a possible correlate showed much progress in answering the overall
question and provided results that followed the historic outcomes of the Arab Spring.
My results demonstrate that there is a higher level of regime satisfaction that exists in monarchies
than their republican neighbors. While much of the literature balances institutional features of regime
survival I believe this offers a critical insight that is often overlooked in studying Middle Eastern regimes.
It demonstrates that monarchies may be more effective at meeting the needs of their citizens which
depresses any rally cries for change. The statistical evidence bears this out and my theory distinguishes
that it is because republics set themselves up to fail by relying on a far reaching constituencies with
extensive demands for side payments that are difficult to totally fulfill.
Despite the strong showing in the results there are still some weaknesses in this paper to consider
and ways that this argument can be improved. The Waldnerian theory I propose takes a largely economic
tone that makes it difficult to account for other grievances that can motivate protest movements. While
many of the republican protests during the Arab Spring could be traced to poor economic showings in
recent decades the theory may have a harder time explaining the sectarian motivations for regime change
in the monarchy of Bahrain. But the argument is open for expansion. First it would do well to encompass
more countries and move beyond the Middle East to test if constituent-clientelism and patron-clientelism
carry the same results in other developing states on a global level. Another possible future test could be
inclusion of quasi experimental methods by looking at data where a state moves from one form of
clientelism to the next via regime change and observe what the data bears out in that scenario across time.
The recent Arab Spring has motivated a lot of scholarship in Middle Eastern comparative politics
as social scientists seek to balance its primary causes and grapple with the relative immunity of the Arab
monarchs. While some look at institutional, strategic, and cultural variables as to how they causally
interacted with this recent phenomenon my hope is that this exploration into the attitudes of individual
citizens should shed some new light and motivate further research for regime survival within a localized
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perspective. After all, the Arab Spring was a revolution from below so therefore we should seek to better
understand the local citizen’s perspective.
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